A thread for PT project business cases, costs and economics.
North Coast Connect - Project business case evaluation summary
Infrastructure Australia (2020)
URL: North Coast Connect | Infrastructure Australia
URL: https://www.infrastructureaustralia.gov.au/sites/default/files/2021-03/North%20Coast%20Connect%20Evaluation%20Summary.pdf
Summary
The following IA business case evaluation was from a submission by a private consortium. The general idea was to reduce travel time to the Sunshine Coast to below 60 minutes. A tilt train operation was proposed with vehicles capable of 165 km/hr on the route. Unlike what happens on the Perth Joondalup and Mandurah lines, a poor frequency was proposed of 30 minutes during peak hour and one hour during the off-peak.
The indicative timeframe for construction starting was 2025 with project completion by 2034, a. nine year project window. The BCR was negative at the 7% level, and a BCR for the 4% level was not given.
Overall the costs for this project were roughly estimated at $6 billion, with sensitive environmental sites along the route being complicating factors. The lack of endorsement of this project by IA and the long timeframes involved suggest that the DSCRL project to the Sunshine Coast will almost certainly be done in stages over a long period of time.
Further, the very poor frequency also likely contributed to a value of time savings estimate that was underwhelming. Rail is very expensive, so where it is built it should be given the best chance of being well-used. Poor frequency acts against that.
Notes
The North Coast Connect Consortium of SMEC, Stockland, Urbis and KPMG explored upgrades to the North Coast Rail connection to facilitate faster passenger rail services between Brisbane and the regions of Moreton Bay and the Sunshine Coast.
The North Coast Connect business case steering committee included representatives from the Queensland Department of Transport and Main Roads, Sunshine Coast Council, Morton Bay Council and Brisbane City Council.
Fast Rail: North Coast Connect – Fast Rail from Brisbane to Moreton Bay and the Sunshine Coast
Perth Forrestfield-Airport Link
Infrastructure Australia (2016)
URL: Forrestfield Airport Link | Infrastructure Australia
The project would provide a new 8.5km rail spur to the airport, with three new railway stations and two bus interchanges. The project provides benefits in safety, transport user time and resource savings, and rail de-crowding; as well as significant environmental benefits.
Main findings were that the project would be about $1.9 billion to deliver, including lengthly 8.5 km bored tunnels. This is significant, as it would suggest that long tunnels with few stations could also be a potentially viable approach to improve the SEQ rail network. The BCR was easily net positive, coming in at around 1.4.
Cost per-km was about 223.5 million/km.
Generally IMO, you cannot use Western Australia per-km cost directly as an East-Coast per-km cost. Projects on the Australian East Coast tend to cost 2x whatever is done in Perth on a per-km basis, so you would need to adjust figures upwards when producing a corresponding East Coast value.
Current patronage on the line is running at an average of 401,699 boardings per month. If this continues to the end of the financial year (Transperth uses that as the year-end) the line will see usage hit around 4.8 million boardings. 
An incredible result for a spur of just 3 stations, set in low density, high car use etc. The trip takes just 18 minutes from Perth station. The comparable car trip is about 20 minutes.
The other thing is that the PTA decided to place a station at the Airport fringe, called Redcliffe. This is about 500 m from DFO Perth, Woolworths Perth Airport etc. Building a Skygate station at Brisbane Airport/DFO might not be a bad idea after all.
Notes
Transperth Transport Performance (Airport Line)
https://www.pta.wa.gov.au/about-us/priorities-and-performance/transport-performance#Airport-Line-530
1 Like
Direct Sunshine Coast Rail Line
Detailed_business_case_summary_March_2024.pdf (1.8 MB)
Notes
Direct Sunshine Coast Line Business Case
Direct Sunshine Coast Rail Line (Stage 1 – Beerwah to Caloundra)
Evaluation Summary - Direct Sunshine Coast Rail Line - PUBLICATION_1.pdf (435.4 KB)
Benefit cost ratio at 7%: 0.15 rising to 0.19 after wider economic benefits (WEBs). This is based on P50 costs (P90 costs are higher but more certain). Main risks and cost escalation factors are cultural, heritage, environmental together with quite a lot of building activity already happening (or scheduled to happen) in SEQ at the same time.
The upcoming 2025 Federal Election provides an opportunity to gain further funding for this project.
Review summary
Infrastructure Australia has evaluated the business case for the Direct Sunshine Coast Rail Line (DSCRL). The proponent is seeking additional funding for Stage 1 of the proposal, which is therefore the focus of our evaluation. As a result of our review, we consider that further work is required before additional Australian Government investment is expended on the project.
The DSCRL proposal aims to reduce pressure on the region’s road network, which is being affected by population growth and limited public transport options. We recognise the potential for sustainable public transport options in the Sunshine Coast region to increase connectivity between new housing and employment and reduce reliance on private vehicles.
There are significant opportunities in the region to deliver on these ambitions, however, the current proposal predicts that the new rail line would have little effect on public transport use or easing congestion. The business case reports that DSCRL is only expected to increase public transport use from 1.4% to 1.9% within the region by 2046, equivalent to an additional 9,400 people boarding a train per day.
Stage 1 of DSCRL is estimated to reduce travel time to Brisbane from the Sunshine Coast by 106 minutes in 2046. However, the number of patrons traveling to Brisbane on the rail network is forecast to grow to only 12.5% in the same timeframe. Rail patronage may increase above current forecasts if population growth exceeds expectations and there is a greater shift in mode share, as has been experienced between Brisbane and the Gold Coast. However, low expected patronage between the Sunshine Coast and Brisbane reflects the high car dependency in the region.
Based on the Queensland Government’s analysis, the low level of patronage to Brisbane would not substantially increase with the extension of the rail line to Maroochydore as the region is heavily self-contained. Employment growth in the region, particularly in Maroochydore, and work-from-home behaviour, means that the majority of current and future residents north of Nirimba are not expected to travel to Brisbane daily.
The proposal is forecast to generate a net increase in greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions because the emissions from construction and operation would not be offset by reductions in private car use. While there are likely to be opportunities to reduce emissions, these have not been well developed and costed in the proposal.
The proponent is planning for Stage 1 (Beerwah to Caloundra) to be in operation for the 2032 Olympic and Paralympic Games. However, we understand that the majority of venues and accommodation will be located further north, meaning other transport services will be needed to support the operation of the Games.
There are significant delivery risks with only limited geotechnical assessments undertaken to date and, noting the large volume of concurrent construction activity in South East Queensland, market sounding is not yet complete. Environmental and cultural heritage impacts require approvals, which also increases the risk for on-time and on budget delivery.
Risks of cost escalation and delivery delays are significant, given the current market capacity and supply chain challenges. Overall, the cost of Stage 1 of the DSCRL will materially outweigh the monetised social, economic and environmental benefits. This is based on a cost estimate of $5.5 billion, however the proponent anticipates that Stage 1 costs could be as much as $7 billion, which would further reduce net benefits.
Brisbane Metro Business Case
One of the points to respond to here is the criticism of the project having increased its cost from about $0.9 billion to about $1.6 billion. However, the business case put together by Infrastructure Australia shows that the present value of benefits resulting from Brisbane Metro is about $2.13 billion. The BCR is 2.4, which is very good.
In other words, even if the project cost rose to $2 billion, it would still be worthwhile and have net positive benefits for passengers.
Much of this cost is simply the boring of the Adelaide Street tunnel and Cultural Centre works, followed by the alteration of various busway stations (e.g. UQ Lakes, Buranda).
The second thing to note here is the cost breakdown. Notice how there is Australian Government money and Brisbane City Council money, but no Queensland Government money. This is unusual for such a large project that is largely taking place on Queensland Government owned busway infrastructure.
Notes
I note that under Section 4, ‘infrastructure changes – a new underground station at the Cultural Centre’ is included in the business case under the original cost estimates.
I am curious about the magnitude of economic benefits (PT user, road user, other benefits etc.) that are entangled in the elimination of that particular bottleneck.
Would be curious to see the model updated with current project costs and eliminating costs/benefits associated with that particular piece of infrastructure, noting the cost will well-exceed the projected 903.5 million without that project. I think it’s fair that we consider what we actually get for the money, given this rather significant divergence from the originally assessed case.
I digress, but coming from a health economics/health technology assessment background, I still think a discount rate of 7% seems… excessive 
.
Sydney Metro Final Business Case (2016)
-
Business case absolutely essential for making the case for Sydney metro, given the size of financing required, cost and risk involved in the project.
-
Benefits not just coming from the choice of Metro, but also from the removal of Bankstown line trains from the Heavy Rail network, freeing up capacity and reducing delays on the existing Sydney trains network.
-
Clear capacity case based on demand, and a net positive BCR of 1.47 to 1.6.
Modelling undertaken for Infrastructure NSW by Deloitte Access Economics demonstrated that the Rebuilding NSW initiative and the investment proposed in the State Infrastructure Strategy Update 2014 could effectively increase NSW gross state product (GSP) by $30.9 billion in 2035.
The Final Business Case (summarised in this report) was prepared to enable the NSW Government to make an informed project investment decision for the Sydney Metro City & Southwest, and to make an informed decision on the precise timing, scope, funding and delivery strategy for the Project.
By 2036 demand on the T2 Inner West and South Line and the T3 Bankstown Line will exceed capacity, to the extent that some customers will not be able to board the trains and there will be major impacts to the reliability of these services. Demand will exceed capacity on the T1 Northern Line, T1 North Shore Line and T2 Airport and South Line services, and will have a material impact on service reliability. By 2036, demand for rail services will be at 108 per cent of capacity, leading to widespread crowding and decreases in reliability.
Benefits
-
Savings in the perceived cost of travel for public transport users, including travel time, reliability, train de-crowding, station de-crowding and amenity. - $6.3 billion
-
Travel time savings are generated through increased accessibility between particular origins and destinations as a direct result of Sydney Metro City & Southwest. - $1.8 billion
-
The reduction in unexpected wait time for customers as a result of reducing train crowding and station dwell times at Central, Wynyard and Town Hall Stations. - $0.99 billion
-
Higher patronage levels in future years as a result of higher density land uses around the Sydney Metro City & Southwest stations and more frequent turn-up-and-go travel behaviours throughout the day. - $0.5 billion
-
Reduction in crowding on trains as a result of Sydney Metro City & Southwest. - $0.73 billion
-
Reduction in station crowding - $1.5 billion
-
Reduction in displaced trips - $0.49 billion
-
Improvement in amenity of Bankstown Line stations - $1.90 billion
Notes
Sydney Metro Final Business Case (2016)